Executive Summary
In the first half of 2018, sugarcane productivity in Indonesia decreased by 2.56 tonnes/ha while the extraction rate fell by 0.36 percentage point compared to 2017. Meanwhile, the demand for sugar is growing steadily, as indicated by an increase in per capita consumption of more than 22% from 2009 to 2017. The combination of lower productivity and higher demand contributes to high prices for white crystal sugar-the domestic price was nearly three times the international market price in August 2018.
High prices impact both private consumers and the food and beverages (F&B) industry. They also affect agricultural workers in general because two-thirds of them are net food consumers paying these higher prices. Government programs to improve domestic productivity via regulations by the Minister of Agriculture (MOA) 53/2015 and Minister of Industry (MOI) 50/2012 have not achieved their intended results.
The implementation of import quotas and limiting licenses to state-owned enterprises (SOEs), as stipulated in the regulation of the Minister of Trade (MOT) 117/2015, aggravates the situation. Restricting entry to the market through a non-transparent import licensing process contributes to Indonesia's uncompetitive sugar market. As a result, imports cannot lower sugar prices to help the consumers in Indonesia.
We propose a two-step policy reform to lower sugar prices that provides sufficient time for relevant stakeholders to adjust to the new policies. First, within five years, the government should revise MOT 117/2015 Article 5 (2) on import licensing to allow qualified private sector companies to import sugar. This revision must include a more transparent licensing process to prevent cartel practices by either SOEs or private importers. Consumers will enjoy more options when buying sugar thanks to the increasing number of importers. In this first stage of reform, the quantity of sugar imported will remain under government control to limit the impact of the reform on sugarcane prices for the domestic farmers.
The first stage might be insufficient to address the competing goals of lowering sugar prices for consumers and keeping sugarcane prices high to protect farmers. This is why a second stage of reform is necessary. In the first ten years of reform, the government must provide support for restructuring the practices and upgrading the technology used by farmers and sugar milling factories. This support must be accompanied by a specific target for increased productivity. After these first ten years, the government should remove the import quota stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 3, allowing imports to satisfy domestic market demand. This timeframe should provide sugarcane farmers and the national sugar industry with sufficient time to prepare for competition with imported sugar. These reforms will result in a more competitive sugar market with lower sugar prices for Indonesian consumers.
Current Situation
Indonesia's central government classifies sugar as one of seven strategic food commodities, alongside rice paddy, maize, soybeans, poultry, chili, and beef (Ministry of Agriculture, 2015a, p. 2) . Official statistics estimate that Indonesia's sugar industry includes 746,037 farmers and 267,931 laborers (Ministry of Agriculture, 2016b, p. 14) . In 2016, the value of the industry was estimated at IDR 25 trillion or 0.20% of the total GDP of IDR 12,406 trillion (Statistics Indonesia, 2016; GBG, 2016) . The associated labor force and value of the sugar industry explain its strategic importance to the economy and the rural livelihood of Indonesians.
In 2017, sugar consumption in Indonesia reached 5.65 million tonnes, higher than neighboring countries such as Australia (1.20 million tonnes), the Philippines (2.20 million tonnes), and Thailand (2.67 million tonnes) (U.S. Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2017 [USDA], -2018 . 1 Data from 2018 shows that Indonesians consume 26.34 kg of sugar per year, more than in Vietnam (17.18 kg/capita/year), India (19.26 kg/capita/year), and the Philippines (21.65 kg/capita/year).
Indonesia classifies sugar into three categories: raw sugar used for domestic sugar refining; refined sugar used by the medium and large-scale food and beverages (F&B) industry; and white crystal sugar used by regular households and small-scale F&B business units such as those who make cakes, biscuits, and syrups (Cicilia, 2018; Pujitiasih, Arifin, & Situmorang, 2014, p. 34; USDA, 2017) . 2 The term sugar in this paper refers to the combination of all three categories unless otherwise stated.
While the regulation of the Minister of Industry (MOI) 10/2017 stipulates that all F&B industry businesses must use refined sugar, a minimum purchase quantity of one tonne per transaction means small-scale businesses are unable to comply with this requirement-on average, these businesses use less than 600 kg per year (APINDO, 2017) . Instead, they rely on white crystal sugar that is more widely available in the consumer market. 3 Up to April 2018, those who would like to purchase refined sugar had to do so through an auction system via the Jakarta Commodity Market coordinated by Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Agency (Badan Pengawas Perdagangan Berjangka Komoditi / BAPPEBTI) under the Ministry of Trade as stipulated in MOT 16/2017 on Refined Sugar Trading. The Ministry annulled this regulation in April 2018 as recommended by the Anti-Corruption Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi / KPK), which deemed this regulation unfair for the small-scale industry. After that, the Ministry allowed businesses to purchase the refined sugar directly from the producers and/or importers. However, in June 2018, the Ministry revealed that they plan to re-enact this regulation and to strengthen it with a presidential regulation (Agustinus, 2018; Sutari, 2018; Yuniarta & Winarto, 2018) . The Ombudsman Indonesia stated that the Ministry is allowed to do this as part of corrective measures to improve the auction system so it can benefit the small-scale industry (Ombudsman Indonesia, 2018) .
Figure 1
World Price of Raw, Refined, and White Crystal Sugar, 2007-2017 Indonesia, 2017c, p. 80). 4 At the end of 2017, the poverty line in Indonesia was set at IDR 370,910 per month (Statistics Indonesia, 2018) . This means those who live at the poverty line spend nearly 2% (IDR 7,183) of their monthly income on white crystal sugar, 5 and those below the poverty line spend an even larger portion. By this calculation, a five-person household spends around IDR 35,000 for white crystal sugar every month and could have saved around IDR 22,000 per month if they were paying world market price. 6 At the same consumption level, an Indonesian household pays nearly IDR 7,000 more per month than a household of the same size in Malaysia. On the supply side, domestic sugar production in Indonesia suffers from both on-farm and off-farm issues. On-farm, the productivity of sugarcane plantations is determined by land fertility, labor availability, irrigation systems, and the application of technology (Susila et al., 2005a Off-farm, the extraction rate of sugar milling factories, 9 which depends on sugarcane quality, the required cutting time, and the management quality of factory machinery (Purwono, 2003, p. 1) , reached only 7.50% in 2017/2018 (US Department of Agriculture [USDA], 2017b, p. 2,3) . This is lower than in neighboring countries such as the Philippines, Thailand, and Australia whose extraction rates reached 9.20%, 10.70%, and 14.12% respectively. The age of sugarcane milling factories in Indonesia 8 India is the largest sugar producer in Asia; Brazil is the largest sugar producer in the world (USDA 2018). 9 Extraction rate refers to the percent of sucrose obtained from processing sugar beets or sugarcane, compared to the sucrose content in the sugar beet or sugarcane before processing (USDA, 2018d) Figure 3 ). In the same period, average sugar consumption was 5.30 million tonnes per year, matching the supply. Nevertheless, as Figure 3 shows, official statistics show that there were periods when sugar supply from domestic production and imports fell short of national consumption. For example, from 2014/2015 to 2016/2017, supply was 4.42% lower than consumption, creating an average deficit of 251,667 tonnes over those years. The Ministry of Trade reports that, on average, around 300,000 tonnes of refined sugar is traded illegally every year
According to those in the sugar industry, the deficit was caused by a lack of clarity about the quantity of remaining stock (before production and import) at the beginning of each time period (Former Representative of PT. RNI, 2018; Representative of PT. OI & PT. KTM, 2018) . 10 Refined sugar intended for industry use was siphoned into the consumer market and sold as white crystal sugar at the higher price of white crystal sugar. This illegal practice contributed to the lack of clarity in available data because it created "phantom stock" that was not recorded in the official statistics. The Ministry of Trade reports that, on average, around 300,000 tonnes of refined sugar is traded illegally every year (Idris, 2017; Primadhyta, 2017; Safutra, 2017) .
Existing Policies

On-farm and off-farm policies
The Indonesian government has two ministerial regulations aimed at increasing domestic sugar productivity. The regulation of the Minister of Agriculture (MOA) 53/2015 focuses on improving on-farm practices by improving sugarcane cultivation techniques through the development of prime types of sugarcane varieties, estimation of the best planting periods, and dissemination of information about good planting practices. This regulation also works to ensure the welfare of sugarcane farmers and sugar milling factory workers by providing them with healthcare insurance, food and beverages, and, when necessary, medical treatments.
Off-farm, the government implements MOI 50/2012, which stipulates that the central government provide financial support for state-owned sugar milling factories to fully or partially replace and/or repair their machinery and provide technological upgrades as part of a revitalization program (Article 3 (1)). In 2018, the government allocated IDR 8.6 billion of the state budget to this program, along with revitalization of machinery for forestry and other plantation products, including timber and palm oil (Ministry of Industry, 2017, p. 67).
International trade policies
The Indonesian government imposes Minister of Trade (MOT) regulation 117/2015, which aims to use imports to stabilize sugar prices (Article 4). By implementing this regulation, the government controls the quantity of sugar imported and tries to maintain a difficult balance between affordable prices for consumers and profitable production for domestic sugar producers. Article 3 of the regulation stipulates that the quantity of imported sugar is determined through the ministerial coordination meeting. Meanwhile, Article 5 (2) states that sugar import licenses are reserved for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with a General Importer Identification Number (API-U).
Analysis
Ideal Cultivation Practices for Sugarcane in Indonesia
According to the Good Agricultural Practices guideline published by the Ministry of Agriculture (2015b, p. 7), sugarcane in Indonesia can grow in either irrigated or rain-fed farmland. A majority (57%) of farmland is irrigated, while 36% is rain-fed type and the rest (7%) is river-based (Ministry of Agriculture, 2016a, pp. 9-10). For irrigated sugarcane plantations, planting is ideally conducted near the start of or during the dry season, between April and August.
11 Ideal planting for rain-fed sugarcane takes place between September and November, near the end of dry season and up to the beginning of rainy season.
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The harvest should be conducted at least 11 months after planting when sugarcane has reached a minimum height of two meters (Indrawanto, Purwono, Siswanto, Syakir, & Rumini, 2010, p. 9) . During the harvest period, the less rainfall the better. High rainfall causes water to seep into the sugarcane stalk, reducing its sucrose content (Department of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries of South Africa, 2014, p. 21). Prolonged drought caused by El Nino 13 contributed to falling productivity. In 2011/2012, productivity decreased by nearly 15%, from 78.24 tonnes/ha in the previous period to 66.67 tonnes/ha (Figure 4 ), in part due to El Nino hitting the country from June to November 2012 (Maulidiya, Ihwan, & Jumarang, 2012, pp. 6, 13, 14) . Similarly, in 2014 and 2015 El Nino caused delays to the planting period. These delays decreased productivity by 11.74% from 74.89 tonnes/ ha in 2013/2014 to 66.10 tonnes/ha in (USDA, 2014 , p. 4, 2015 , p. 5, 2016 . 11 In normal conditions, the dry season in Indonesia runs from May to October (Meteorology, Climate, and Geophysics Agency [Badan Meteorologi Klimatologi dan Geofisika/BMKG], 2018b, p. 28) . 12 In normal conditions, the rainy season in Indonesia runs from November to April (BMKG, 2018a, p. 30) . 13 El Nino (literal meaning, "The Little Boy") refers to the large-scale climate interaction between the ocean and the atmosphere that typically leads to warmer-than-average temperatures and drier-than-average conditions in various parts of the world for an extended period of time (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration [NOAA], 2018).
On-Farm Situation
In spite of policy interventions, rather than increasing once the regulation was implemented, average productivity fell by 8.52% In addition to the adverse impacts of weather, the unsuitability of the existing sugarcane varieties for current farm locations, insufficient manpower for proper sugarcane cultivation techniques, problematic distribution of fertilizer, and a lack of monitoring of the use of subsidized farming inputs also contributed to falling productivity (Ministry of Trade, 2014, p. 14) (Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board [Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal/BKPM], 2015, p. 39) . In addition, the difficulty of obtaining farm land that is conveniently located near milling factories means that domestic sugar companies must rely on poor road infrastructure to transport their sugarcane harvest (Indonesian Refined Sugar Association, 2016) . These circumstances have all contributed to the low success rate of on-farm improvement efforts stipulated in MOA 53/2015.
Off-Farm Situation
Despite government grants that offer financial support (as stipulated in MOI 50/2012), there has been no significant improvement to the age of sugar milling factories in Indonesia. Around 40 of 63 factories are more than 100 years old (USDA, 2017, p. 4) . The need to temporarily stop production during the repair and upgrading process, which may take as long as eight months to complete, may contribute to the reluctance of factory owners to accept the government's grants (Asea Brown Boveri, n.d.). Furthermore, as shown in existing studies, major changes in an industry, including machinery upgrades, may disrupt the flow of work in affected organizations, unsettle businesses, and create uncertainty about their future operating earnings and cash flow (Lin, Lee, & Gibbs, 2008, p. 540) ; (Ahad, Hasan, Hoque, & Chowdhury, 2018, p. 34) . During a similar transformation process in Poland, not all sugar companies were able to survive a capital upgrade process-only 18 of the 76 sugar refineries open in 2001 managed to survive to 2017 (Kotyza, Svatoš, Smutka, & Pawlak, 2018, p. 87) .
With only minimal improvements to sugar milling efficiency, the extraction rate in Indonesia depends heavily on the weather and is more vulnerable to the adverse impacts of extreme drought and prolonged rainy seasons ( Figure 5 ). For example, in 2013, Indonesia experienced a long rainy season that lasted until July. This delayed planting in irrigated lands and led to a decrease sugarcane sucrose content (USDA, 2014, p. 4). As a result, in 2013/2014, the sugar extraction rate in Indonesia decreased by nearly a full percentage point from 7.70% in the previous year to 6.65%. At the same time, the extraction rate in the Philippines and Thailand increased by 0.32 and 0.88 percentage point respectively. Similarly, in 2017/2018, when Indonesia experienced La Nina 14 it both reduced the crop's sucrose content and created complications in transporting the yield from the farmlands to the milling factories (USDA, 2017, p. 5). As a result, the extraction rate in Indonesia decreased by 0.36 percentage point from the previous period, while the Philippines and Thailand increased their extraction rates by 0.43 and 0.03 percentage point respectively.
Today, the extraction rate in Indonesia (7.50%) is lagging behind the Philippines (9.20%) and Thailand (10.70%) by 1.70 and 3.20 percentage points respectively. If the three countries are to produce the same quantity of sugar, Indonesia needs to harvest 22.67% more sugarcane than the Philippines and 42.67% more sugarcane than Thailand. 15 Since there is a 70% possibility of El Nino returning by the end of 2018 (World Meteorological Organization [WMO], 2018), the sugar extraction rate in Indonesia might take another hit in the near future. 15 For example, if Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand each need to produce one million tonnes of sugar, then Indonesia needs to harvest around 13.3 million tonnes of sugarcane, while the Philippines only need to harvest 10.8 million tonnes and Thailand only needs 9.3 million tonnes.
With only minimal improvements to sugar milling efficiency, the extraction rate in Indonesia depends heavily on the weather and is more vulnerable to the adverse impacts of extreme drought and prolonged rainy seasons
Sugar Prices in the Domestic Market and the International Market
The government's policies to improve domestic sugar productivity have not yielded the desired results. International trade offers an alternative route to lower sugar prices. The significance of international sugar prices to prices in the domestic market can be analyzed by observing the movement of both over a specific time period.
From September 2010 to June 2018, changes in the world sugar price affected sugar prices in Indonesia's domestic market. Most of the time they move in the same direction, both in the short term and the long term ( Figure 6 ). In the short term, a 10% change on the international price corresponds with an instantaneous 6.10% change in the same direction on the domestic price. In the long term, a 10% change on the international price corresponds with a 1.3% change in the same direction on domestic sugar price. 16 These calculations are explained in more detail in Annex I. In September 2010, the price of sugar in Indonesia reached IDR 10,599 per kg, more than twice the price on the international market of IDR 4,456 per kg.
In August 2012, because of the increase of regulated minimum price for sugarcane farmers in India (Business Standard, 2012; The Economic Times, 2012; The Indian Express, 2012), sugar 16 This means, when the international prices go up, the domestic prices will increase as well. On the other hand, when the international prices go down, the domestic prices will decrease, too. This applies to both short and long term, albeit at different percentage as explained in the text above. The other conditions are assumed to remain the same (ceteris paribus).
If the three countries are to produce the same quantity of sugar, Indonesia needs to harvest 22.67% more sugarcane than the Philippines and 42.67% more sugarcane than Thailand.
prices in the international market rose to IDR 4,367 per kg, but it was still 1.98% cheaper than in September 2010. In the same period, sugar prices in Indonesia rose to IDR 12,828 per kg, 21.03% more expensive than in September 2010.
In July 2016, the declining supply of sugar in the international market (ISO, 2016) led to an increase in the price to IDR 5,668 per kg, 27.2% higher than in September 2010. Domestically, though, the sugar price in Indonesia reached its peak at IDR 16,262 per kg, 53.43% than in September 2010.
In June 2017, due to increased production in top sugar producing countries such India, China, and Thailand (USDA, 2017), sugar prices in the international market fell to IDR 4,077 per kg, 8.50% cheaper than in September 2010. In the same period, sugar prices in Indonesia also fell to IDR 13,427 per kg, yet this was still 26.68% more expensive than the domestic price in September 2010.
In July 2018, while sugar prices in Indonesia went down along with the price decrease in the international market, the price difference between them had grown 36.16% larger than it was in September 2010.
These shifts and differences in price illustrate the correlation between sugar prices in Indonesia and the international market. In spite of this correlation, the domestic market is unable to take full advantage of falling international market prices when they occur. On the other hand, the domestic market is prone to sharp price increases when international prices rise.
MOT 117/2015, which regulates sugar imports, contributes to the inability of the domestic sugar market in Indonesia to take advantage of lower international sugar prices. This regulation renders the import mechanism ineffective because it allows the government to intervene in the market by restricting imports both via quota and by excluding the qualified private sector from sugar importation, thereby reducing the level of competition in the licensing process.
The import quotas granted by the government are not completely realized by the SOEs it licenses (Table 2) . From 2012 to 2014, import realization decreased every year. Realization in 2014 was 9.78 percentage points lower than in the previous year. Importers argue that they sometimes receive licenses close to the domestic harvest period and are therefore concerned about triggering backlash from sugarcane farmers if they decide to import (Personal Interview, Former Representative of PT. RNI, 4 June 2018). KPPU, 2010) . These companies are free to control their supply to retailers and therefore they are also able to control sugar prices. This situation makes the sugar market prone to cartel practices in which the license-holding companies seek to collude and block the entry of new market players, stifling the competition and keeping sugar prices high for consumers.
Due to the uncompetitive sugar market, SOEs are able to keep their import licenses despite their ineffective import timing. When international prices were high, they repeatedly imported sugar in larger quantities compared to when the international prices were low (Figure 7 ). For example, when international price dropped to IDR 4,150.36 in January 2014, SOEs imported only 213,273 tonnes, but in June 2014, when the international price rose by 14.77% to IDR 4,762.45, they more than doubled their import quantity to 437,134 tonnes. Similarly in 2016, when in January the international price was low, at IDR 4,294.37, only 142,250 tonnes of sugar was imported. Two months later, when the international price rose by 4.26% to IDR 4,477.52, import quantity increased by nearly four times to 540,132 tonnes. Sugar Import Volume: Statistics Indonesia: Foreign Trade Statistical Bulletin-Imports (2010 , including raw sugar (HS Code 1701.13.00.00 & 1701.14.00.00) and refined sugar (HS Code 1701.99.11.00) 17 Oligopolistic competition refers to a market structure in which only a small number of firms act as sellers. According to economic theory, these firms set prices not from the market, but by coordinating among themselves through collective effort or through the leadership of one firm. They are able to block new entrants, hinder innovation, and increase prices and this harms the consumers (Investopedia, 2018) .
Sugar market are prone to cartel practices in which the license-holding companies seek to collude and block the entry of new market players, stifling the competition and keeping sugar prices high for consumers.
Despite the large quantity of imports and in part because the sugar was imported while international prices were rising, domestic prices increased with imports, following the same trend as the international market (as explained in Figure 6 in the previous section). For example, while the amount of sugar imported more than doubled from May 2013 to June 2013 (263,646 tonne to 688,256 tonne), sugar prices slightly increased, by 0.17% (Rp12,367 to Rp12,388) rather than decreasing ( Figure  8) . A similar case can be seen from April to June 2016. Import quantity more than doubled (183,199 tonne to 469,086 tonne) but sugar prices increased by 20.31% (Rp13, 182 to Rp15, 860) . This illustrates that the uncompetitive licensing process leads to an uncompetitive market, which then leads to poor decisions regarding import timing and quantity and contributes to higher sugar prices for the consumers. Studies show that uncompetitive markets resulting from limited market access for competing firms may lead to a reduction in consumer welfare stemming from high prices (Issa, 2017, p. 664; Jørgensen & Schröder, 2006, p. 2) . On the other hand, international experience shows that free trade between countries brought about various positive impacts. For example, the free trade agreement between Taiwan and Switzerland not only creates savings potential for importers on both sides, but also improves the framework of economic relations between the two countries (Ziltener, 2017, p. 135 ).
In the sugar industry, bilateral free trade in sugar and sweeteners between Mexico and the United States (U.S.), established in 2008, has led to sugar market integration between the two countries. Integration has been accompanied by joint programs between the U.S. and Mexican
The uncompetitive licensing process leads to an uncompetitive market, which then leads to poor decisions regarding import timing and quantity and contributes to higher sugar prices for the consumers.
governments in which they exchange, analyze, and publish up-to-date and transparent data on the sugar market. As a result, sugarcane farmers and sugar importers in both countries have access to reliable market information when conducting their respective businesses (Zahniser & Moreno, 2014, pp. 216-217) .
The Scenarios
Depending on what sugar trade policy that the government decides to pursue, there are four scenarios that could come about in the sugar market. These scenarios assume there is no significant improvement to either on-farm or off-farm productivity levels, which are explained in the previous section.
Scenario I -Business as Usual
The first scenario is that the government maintains its existing policies. The trade restrictions stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 3 and Article 5 (2) prevent the import mechanism from lowering sugar prices. The impact of restrictive trade policies on consumer prices is measured using nominal rates of protection (NRP). NRP calculates the proportion by which domestic sugar producer prices exceed the prices of imported sugar at the country's border due to trade policy (Marks, 2015, p. 10) .
The NRP for sugar reached 48.10% in 2015. This means the price of domestic sugar from sugarcane farmers in Indonesia is 48.10% more expensive than sugar from Thailand (or any international market) arriving for import at major Indonesian ports. 18 Indonesian non-tariff trade policies, such as its non-transparent and uncompetitive licensing process, are responsible for more than 74% of the NRP value.
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Meanwhile, since productivity levels remain the same, domestic sugarcane farmers are unable to improve their income through their farming activities, and since two-thirds of all farmers in Indonesia are net food consumers (McCulloch & Timmer, 2008, p. 35) , high sugar prices have a negative impact on their ability to purchase sugar and other food items.
Scenario II -Eliminating Import Quotas Mechanism
The second scenario refers to the removal of the import quota stipulated in MOT 117/2015 (Article 3) while the import licensing system stays the same. Licenses are only granted to the SOEs, as stated in Article 5 (2) . In this scenario, while there is no limitation on the quantity of sugar imported, import market competition will remain oligopolistic due to the limited number of importers. In these circumstances, the SOEs are able to control sugar prices by controlling the quantity of imported sugar. Consumers will still have limited options for buying sugar, the quantity of imported sugar may be insufficient to fulfil the deficit of domestic production when compared to demand, and sugar prices in Indonesia's domestic market will remain higher than in the international market. These outcomes are similar to outcomes to those in the first scenario.
Scenario III -Revising Restrictive Import License
The third scenario is one in which import license policy as stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 5 (2) is revised while the government remains in control of the sugar import quantity as stipulated in Article 3. In this scenario, import licenses would be granted not only to SOEs, but also to the qualified private sector. This means that import licenses would primarily serve for identification and not as a restriction to the market.
This reform must focus on preventing cartel practices by either SOEs or private importers. It should do this by ensuring that the licensing process becomes more open, more transparent, and easier and faster to complete. This would make stock hoarding and price speculation less likely because importers will be subject to increasing competition. Eliminating cartel practices, stock hoarding, and price speculation would allow consumers to enjoy more options for sugar as the market supply comes from more importers.
Since the government would still control the quantity of imported sugar in the market, the impact of imports on the income of domestic sugarcane farmers should be limited. On the other hand, maintaining the government's interventions on the sugar supply might limit the ability of a more open and transparent licensing system to lower sugar prices for consumers, including the smallscale sugarcane farmers who are net consumers.
Scenario IV -Eliminating the Import Quota System and Revising Restrictive Import License
The fourth scenario refers to the most comprehensive reform to MOT 117/2015, in which the import licensing process (Article 5 (2)) is reformed and the import quota (Article 3) is removed. In this scenario, the impact of the revision to Article 5 (2) is the same as explained the third scenario. Meanwhile, the removal of import quota should allow the import mechanism to help the domestic market more fully adjust to the international market situation. These reforms would pave the way for imported sugar to enter the market more quickly and more effectively fill the deficit between domestic sugar supply and consumer demand. As a result, sugar prices should become lower for consumers.
The NRP value for sugar, which reaches 48.10% under the current restrictions, suggests that more open trade has the potential to reduce sugar prices in the domestic market by nearly half of their current level.
These reforms and their outcomes would also benefit around 67 million households 20 who are net sugar consumers, since they do not work on sugarcane farms nor in the sugar industry. On the other hand, this situation might present difficulties for domestic sugarcane farmers and sugar milling factories, who would have to compete with imported sugar sold at cheaper prices.
All four scenarios mentioned above and their expected outcomes are presented in a matrix in Annex II.
Recommendations
Government policy to improve domestic sugar productivity as stipulated in MOA 53/2015 and MOI 50/2012 has not worked as intended, either on-farm or off-farm. Sugarcane productivity in 2017/2018 was lower than in 2016/2017, and even lower than it was in 2008/2009. Meanwhile, the extraction rate of sugar milling factories has not improved significantly since 2008 and has lagged behind the Philippines and Thailand. Meanwhile, import restrictions stated in MOT 117/2015 contribute to the uncompetitive nature of the sugar market in Indonesia, especially the import licensing process. All of these factors contribute to high sugar prices in Indonesia, in which white crystal sugar was nearly three times more expensive than in the international market in August 2018.
Based on the scenarios projected in the previous section, we propose a two-stage policy reform to lower sugar prices while providing sufficient time for the relevant stakeholders to adjust to the new policies.
First, in the first five years of reform the government should implement the third scenario, in which they revise MOT 117/2015 Article 5 (2) on import licensing, opening sugar importation not only to SOEs but also to the qualified private sector. This revision must emphasize creating a more transparent and fair licensing process to prevent cartel practices by either SOEs or private importers. Once these reforms are in place, companies will be unlikely to hoard stock and speculate on prices as they face increasing competition with a larger number of importers. As for consumers, they will have more options when buying sugar as the supply comes from an increasing number of importers.
While implementing these reforms, the government should keep its control over the quantity of imported sugar as stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 3. So long as government control over import quantities remains strong, reform of the licensing process will be met with minimum resistance from domestic sugarcane farmers and the domestic sugar industry. This will make reform less challenging to implement and make it possible to garner support from both the public and members of legislature.
The second stage of reforms is related to the policy dilemma faced by the government when it comes to sugar prices: if prices fall, domestic farmers might suffer, but if prices keep increasing, consumers will suffer. Opening up imports as mentioned in the first stage of this reform is not sufficient to solve this dilemma. Therefore, the farmers and milling factories need to receive substantial support during the early part of the second stage of reforms to prepare them for its remaining process.
In the first ten years of reform, the government must assist farmers and local sugar milling factories in restructuring farming practices and investing in better technology. This assistance must be given with a clear and specific target for productivity increases and extraction rate improvement in accordance with the government's objectives for on-farm and off-farm programs. Without such a target, programs might fail yet again and as a result sugar prices will further rise and hurt consumers.
First, in the first five years of reform the government should revise MOT 117/2015 Article 5 (2) on import licensing, opening sugar importation not only to SOEs but also to the qualified private sector.
In the first ten years of reform, the government must assist farmers and local sugar milling factories in restructuring farming practices and investing in better technology.
After ten years, the government should implement the fourth scenario, which is in addition to revising the import licensing process as in the first stage of reforms, it also should remove the import quota stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 3 and allowing import quantities to be determined by market supply and demand. This timeframe should give sufficient time for the government to implement both on-farm and off-farm programs to increase productivity, extraction rate, and the overall quality of domestic sugar industry. This will mean that sugarcane farmers and the national sugar industry should be better prepared to compete with imported sugar. As long as the on-farm and off-farm programs start showing positive results within this timeframe, the government should be able to minimize resistance to this reform from domestic sugarcane farmers and sugar milling factories.
After ten years, the government should remove the import quota stipulated in MOT 117/2015 Article 3 and allow import quantities to be determined by market supply and demand.
Most importantly, consumers will enjoy the benefit of a more competitive sugar market that will lower sugar prices. As detailed in the fourth scenario, more open trade in imported sugar could potentially reduce sugar prices in the consumers market by nearly half of its current level.
In addition, as shown in Figure 10 , in some periods there was an increase of sugar import volume that was not followed by the decrease of domestic sugar price. The sugar import volume rose significantly from 263,646 tonnes in May 2013 to 688,256 tonnes in June 2013. Unfortunately, it did not affect the sugar market price as it rose from Rp12,388 to Rp12,390 in the same period. This was only one example in which prices rose when the import volume was also increasing. (***): denotes significance at 1% confidence level| (*): denotes significance at 10% confidence level And as shown in Equation 2 results below, in the short run, a 10% change in the world price of sugar corresponds with 6.1% change in the same direction on the domestic price, ceteris paribus, vice versa.
(***): denotes significance at 1% confidence level | (*): denotes significance at 10% confidence level.
